Systems based on theories with partial self-application are relevant to the formalization of constructive mathematics and as a logical basis for functional programming languages. In the literature they are either presented in the form of partial combinatory logic or the partial calculus, and sometimes these two approaches are erroneously considered to be equivalent. In this paper we address some defects of the partial calculus as a constructive framework for partial functions. In particular, the partial calculus is not embeddable into partial combinatory logic and it lacks the standard recursiontheoretic model. The main reason is a concept of substitution, which is not consistent with a strongly intensional point of view. We design a weakening of the partial calculus, which can be embedded into partial combinatory logic. As a consequence, the natural numbers with partial recursive function application are a model of our system. The novel point will be the use of explicit substitutions, which have previously been studied in the literature in connection with the implementation of functional programming languages.
Introduction
Partial applicative theories form the basis of various formal systems for constructive mathematics and functional programming. Bishop's style of constructive mathematics (BCM). More recently, Feferman's systems of explicit mathematics were used to develop a unitary axiomatic framework for representing programs, stating properties of programs, and proving properties of programs. The programs considered are taken from functional programming languages, which are mainly based on the untyped calculus. Important references for the use of systems of explicit mathematics in the context of functional programming are Feferman 8 22] . At rst sight, these two approaches seem to be completely equivalent, and sometimes they are treated as such in the literature. But they are only equivalent in the presence of a total logic, since then calculus (without ) can be embedded into combinatory logic and vice versa. For a detailed discussion of the total case also in the context of reductions, the reader is referred to Hindley 14] , and Hindley and Longo 15] . The situation changes drastically if one considers a partial application operation. Then the partial calculus (without ) is no longer embeddable into partial combinatory logic. This is due to the fact that the coding of abstraction in the context of partial combinatory logic is more complicated than usual. The modi ed de nition of does not permit to push a substitution inside an abstraction ( x:t), a principle, which is valid for the partial calculus for obvious reasons. For example, the terms ( x:y) zz=y] and ( x:zz) are not equal in partial combinatory logic. Hence, the stronger concept of substitution in the partial calculus makes its embedding into partial combinatory logic fail. For the same reason, the standard recursion-theoretic model of partial combinatory logic is no longer a model of the partial calculus. Recently, Pezzoli 26] even proved that there is no (reasonable) recursion-theoretic interpretation of the partial calculus at all. As a consequence, it is not possible to determine proof-theoretical upper bounds of applicative theories based on the partial calculus by means of the recursiontheoretic model, as it can be done for the corresponding systems based on partial combinatory logic. Although the upper bounds of those systems can be determined by formalizing a total term model (cf. J ager and Strahm 18]), the adequacy of the partial calculus as a constructive framework for partial functions is seriously put into question. The system simply does not seem to have any reasonable models with a perspicuous constructive meaning that are truly partial. Not only the recursiontheoretic model but also other partial models of partial combinatory logic do not have their counterparts as models of the partial calculus.
In the following we propose a modi cation of the partial calculus, which can be embedded into partial combinatory logic via a natural embedding. As a consequence, this weakened form of the partial calculus has all the partial models which we have for partial combinatory logic. In particular, it is possible to determine upper bounds of systems of explicit mathematics based on our modi ed version of the partial calculus using the recursion-theoretic model. The novel point of our system will be the use of explicit substitutions. According to this approach substitution is no longer a notion of the metalanguage, but an operation axiomatized in the theory under consideration. If t; s 1 ; : : : ; s n are terms and is the substitution fs 1 =x 1 ; : : : ; s n =x n g then t is no longer an abbreviation in the metalanguage for the term t with the variables x i simultaneously replaced by the terms s i , but a purely syntactical object. The evaluation of has to be described by appropriate axioms or rules. So it is possible to provide a very controlled process of substitution. In particular, substitution can be axiomatized in a way that is consistent with the recursion-theoretic model and partial combinatory logic, respectively.
Hence, a substitution can no longer be pushed inside an abstraction ( x:t).
The theory of explicit substitutions has been treated in the literature before, but from a di erent point of view. The main work has been done in the context of implementation of functional programming languages, and application in those systems is always total. The very concern of the present work, however, is to study a partial application operation. A key reference for the previous work on explicit substitution is the paper by Abadi, Cardelli, Curien and L evy 1]. Further investigations are presented in Curien 4 ], Curien, Hardin and L evy 5], Hardin and L evy 13] as well as in Lescanne and Rouyer 20] . Recently, Martin-L of 21] introduced a calculus of explicit substitutions in connection with his intuitionistic theory of types, which is worked out in Tasistro 28] . Let us brie y sketch the procedure of these investigations. In Section 2 we rst introduce partial combinatory logic CL p and the (usual) partial calculus p (without ). In particular, we recapitulate Beeson's logic of partial terms. After having sketched some interesting partial models of CL p , we discuss the substitution problems, which prevent the embedding of p into CL p , and we give Pezzoli's result mentioned above. In Section 3 we give a detailed formulation of the system p , which is a modi cation of p by explicit substitutions. The system incorporates an adaptation of Beeson's logic of partial terms to the framework of explicit substitutions, and rules to evaluate substitutions, of course. We further show that p is embeddable into CL p via a natural embedding and that CL p is also contained in p via the standard embedding. In Section 4, nally, we study the reduction relation on p terms corresponding to the system p . We give a long and tedious proof for the Church Rosser property of this relation. We nish this introduction by mentioning that recently St ark 27] has established a natural relationship between the p calculus and the programming language SCHEME.
2 The systems CL p and p Let us rst de ne partial combinatory logic CL p and the usual partial calculus p , without the rule . The language of CL p includes an in nite list of object variables (in the metalanguage: x; y; z; f; g; h; u; v; w; : : :), constants k and s (partial combinatory algebra), the binary function symbol (application), the equality symbol =, the symbol # (de ned) and the usual propositional connectives and rst order quanti ers.
The language of p contains the same symbols except that k and s are replaced by the abstractor . The principle ( ) induces a weak form of extensionality, which is not consistent with the strongly intensional character of (indices of) partial functions as met e.g. in a recursion-theoretic framework. Formally, this means that it is a priori hopeless to embed calculus into combinatory logic in the presence of ( ). Moreover, the absence of ( ) is in accord with most implementations of calculus based languages: Functions are considered as values, and are only evaluated when arguments are fed in. As already mentioned in the introduction, calculus without ( ) in the context of a total application operation is discussed in 14] and 15].
Nevertheless, we will shortly address fully extensional versions of CL p and p , respectively, i.e. we will consider the strong extensionality axiom (Ext),
Let us brie y sketch some models of CL p . As we are mainly interested in partiality, we will only discuss truly partial models. Of course, there are many models of CL p where application is a total operation, e.g. each model of the calculus is a model of CL p . In the following we give two partial models of CL p .
The recursion-theoretic model PRO. As we will see below, the models just described cannot be made into models of the system p in a reasonable way. This is due to a stronger concept of substitution, which is inherent in the partial calculus p . Our next aim is to code abstraction in CL p . We have to be careful in de ning it in the context of the logic of partial terms, because we want x:t to be de ned for each term t. As we will see below, this modi ed abstraction will have very unpleasant
properties as far as substitution is concerned.
De nition 7 ( x:t)
For each term t of CL p a term x:t is de ned by induction on the complexity of t.
consequence of (3).
In the context of a total logic, one normally de nes x:t := kt, if x 6 2 fvar(t). So
we have e.g. x:(yz) = k(yz). The example shows that x:t# does not hold for the usual de nition of abstraction.
As already mentioned, the abstraction of De nition 7 behaves very badly as far as substitution in expressions is concerned. For a usual abstraction we have ( x:t) s=y] = x:t s=y]; ( ) provided that x 6 = y and x 6 2 fvar(s). This property (which we only need for s# in a partial setting) fails for the de ned above: We have e.g. ( x:y) zz=y] = k(zz), but x:zz = s(kz)(kz).
The fact that the substitution property ( ) does not hold for the abstraction of De nition 7 is not just a technical inconvenience, but has rather strong consequences for the system p as a constructive framework for partial functions. Since ( ) trivially holds in p , the standard embedding of p into CL p fails. As a consequence, the CL p models PRO and CNT described above do not translate into models of p . An illustrative consequence of the stronger substitution concept of p is a very weak form of ( ), which is derivable in p . Let s; t be p terms, and x be a variable with x 6 2 fvar(s) fvar(t by the principle ( ) mentioned above. Now consider k w:(( xy:x)(zz))k = a and k wy:zzk = b , which are de ned for every since abstraction is always de ned. By ( ) we have a = b whenever f (z)g( (z))#; if f (z)g( (z))", then a must be an index of the always unde ned function and b an index for the constant function n 7 ! k y:zzk , so in this case a 6 = b . However, by hypothesis, we can compute a and b , and therefore, we can decide whether fng(n)#. This is not possible.
The following corollary is immediate from the fact that PRO is a model of CL p .
Corollary 10 There is no recursive encoding of in CL p validating ( ).
It should be stressed that the problems described above completely disappear in the presence of the extensionality axiom (Ext). In particular, ( ) holds in CL p + (Ext). : ; x n are variables with x i 6 = x j for 1 i < j n, then ft 1 =x 1 ; : : : ; t n =x n g is a p substitution.
In the following we will often write t instead of (t ) .
The formulas of p are de ned in exactly the same way as the formulas of p , e.g. we have an atomic formula t# for each p term t. In the following we often speak of terms, substitutions, and formulas instead of p terms, p substitutions, and p formulas.
We again want to stress the di erence between t s=x] and tfs=xg. In the rst expression substitution is an abbreviation in the metalanguage for the term t with all free occurrences of x replaced by s. tfs=xg, however, is a purely syntactical object where the substitution fs=xg can only be evaluated by means of appropriate axioms to be described below. We will often use the following abbreviations.
De nition 14 Let = ft 1 =x 1 ; : : : ; t n =x n g and 0 = fs 1 =x 1 ; : : : ; s n =x n g be substitutions and let r be an arbitrary term. Then we de ne: such that y i = x j for a 1 j n.
Now we are ready to give the exact formulation of the system p . The logic of p is an adaptation of Beeson's logic of partial terms to the framework of explicit substitutions. The novel point of this axiom system compared to the system p are the substitution axioms (E), which incorporate rules to evaluate substitutions step by step. Furthermore, an extended form of the axiom in the context of explicit substitutions is given.
De nition 18
The system p is formulated in the language of p and contains the following list of axioms and rules of inference. In the inference rules (17) x does not appear free in the conclusion.
It should be observed that among the substitution axioms (E) we do not have an axiom, which allows us to push a substitution inside an abstraction ( x:t). This is exactly what we want to prevent. Terms of the form ( x:t) can only be resolved if applied to another object, say y. This is re ected in the extended axiom (15) , where an interleaving substitution is allowed. If is the empty substitution " then we have the usual axiom. Weak calculi (i.e. calculi without ( ) or substitution under ) with explicit substitutions have been considered in the literature before. These include Curien's calculus 4], the conditional weak theory cw in Curien, Hardin and L evy 5] as well as the weak theory w of 5]. The main di erence (among other minor di erences) between , cw , w and p lies in the fact that application in the former three calculi is always total, whereas the main concern of the p calculus is to model a partial application operation. As we argued in the previous section, such a partial calculus must not allow ( ) and substitution under in order to be consistent with the intended recursion-theoretic interpretation. Lemma Proof by an easy induction on the complexity of A using the above lemma. Proof We only prove (1). The proof of (2) and (3) is similar. As we will see, essential use is made of the extended axiom (15) . First of all we have ( uv:u)x ' ( v:u)fx=ug; (1) which by axiom (15) 
Proof by induction on the length of a proof of A in CL p . Again the propositional axioms are trivial. The translation of the quanti er axioms is provable in p by Corollary 24. The same corollary also helps in establishing the equality axiom (6). The strictness axioms (9) and the axioms for a partial combinatory algebra were already treated in Lemma 25. The inference rules of CL p readily translate into inference rules of p . The converse of the above lemma also holds. Lemma 27 We have for all CL p formulas A:
Proof We de ne a modi cation ( ) of the translation ( ) CL from p into CL p . ( ) is de ned in the same way as ( ) CL , except that it uses the more complicated coding of abstraction instead of . The term x:t is inductively de ned as follows.
1. If t is the variable x, then x:t := skk.
2. If t is a variable di erent from x or a constant, then x:t := kt.
3. If t is the term (sx), where s 2 fy; k; s; syg and y 6 = x, then x:t := s. 4 . If t is the term (t 1 t 2 ), and if (3) does not apply, then x:t := s( x:t 1 )( x:t 2 ). One easily veri es that (k ) = k and (s ) = s. As an immediate consequence we have (t ) = t and (A ) = A for all CL p terms t and all CL p formulas A, respectively. Furthermore, Lemma 8 holds for , too. In particular, we have x:t# for all CL p terms t. We can, therefore, establish Theorem 21 for ( ) instead of ( ) CL .
Hence, we have p `A =) CL p`A for all p formulas A. Now the claim of the lemma immediately follows from the fact that ( ) is the inverse of ( ) , as we have mentioned above. Here is the nal embedding theorem.
Theorem 28
We have for all CL p formulas A:
Proof Immediate from the previous two lemmas. 4 
Con uent reductions
Once we have introduced the system p , it is natural to study the corresponding reduction relation on p terms. We now de ne a binary relation B on p terms, which re ects a directed equality relation for the system p . B is de ned inductively as follows.
De nition 29 The relation B between p terms is generated by the following clauses (1){(13).
A. Identity (1) Remark 30 We want to stress that the reduction relation B does not take into consideration partiality in p . Hence, B rather corresponds to a total version of p . This is, however, in complete analogy to the system CL p , where truly partial term models are constructed using special reduction strategies of a total reduction relation (cf. p.7), and partiality is re ected by non-terminating reduction sequences.
Summarizing, B provides a general term reduction framework giving rise to partial and total term models for p .
In the following B denotes the restriction of B to substitution reductions, i.e. t B s holds if and only if there is a derivation of t B s according to the above clauses, which does not use (2) and (3). Analogously, B is the restriction of B to reductions.
Finally, we write t B 1 s if t B s is derivable from (2)- (12), i.e. B 1 denotes one step reduction. The relations B 1 and B 1 are de ned in the same way. In the sequel we want to show that B satis es the Church Rosser property. As usual, this will guarantee that all terminating rewrite sequences yield identical results, i.e. we will have uniqueness of normal forms. All attempts to nd a direct proof for the con uence of B failed. In particular, parallelization does not seem to work in order to show con uence of p . Instead we will make use of an interpretation technique due to Hardin, which was identi ed in 12]. This method has subsequently been used several times in order to show con uence for systems of explicit substitutions.
A rst step towards the proof of the Church Rosser property for B is to show that B is Church Rosser. In order to apply an old result by Newman Proof by an easy calculation.
We are ready to prove that is strictly decreasing on B 1 . Lemma 34 We have for all terms t and s:
Proof by a straightforward induction on the length of a derivation of t B 1 s. Let us only discuss the substitution reduction (6), i.e. t = (r ) and s = r( ) for some term r. Then Theorem 36 B is Church Rosser.
Proof The theorem is immediate from Lemma 31 and Corollary 35 and a result by Newman 25] saying that a reduction relation, which is weakly Church Rosser and wellfounded satis es the full Church Rosser property.
Corollary 37 Every p term has a unique substitution normal form.
In the following we denote the substitution normal form of a term t with (t). A substitution = ft 1 =x 1 ; : : : ; t n =x n g is in substitution normal form, if for all i with 1 i n the term t i is in substitution normal form. Analogously, ( ) denotes the substitution normal form of a substitution .
As a further step towards the Church Rosser property of B we make use of a relation B n , which corresponds to reduction on terms in substitution normal form, i.e. terms satisfying (t) = t. We de ne B n via its \parallel" version This nishes the proof of (1). The proof of (2) The case fvar( x:r) \ dom = ; is treated in a similar way.
(4) t is the term (t 0 ). According to the structure of t 0 we can distinguish the following four subcases: (4.1) t 0 is the variable x. Then s is of the form x 0 , where 7 ?! 0 . If x 6 2 dom then (x ) = x = (x 0 ) and there is nothing to prove. Therefore, assume r=x 2 , r 0 =x 2 0 and r 7 ?! r 0 for some terms r and r 0 . Then it is x B 1 r and by the main induction hypothesis we have (x ) = (r) B n (r 0 ) = (x 0 ): (4.2) t 0 is the term ( x:t 00 ). Then s is of the form ( x:t 00 ) 0 , where 7 ?! 0 . If fvar( x:t 00 )\dom = ; then (( x:t 00 ) ) = x:t 00 = (( x:t 00 ) 0 ) and there is nothing to prove. Otherwise, by the side induction hypothesis, we have (( x:t 00 ) ) = ( x:t 00 )( ( x:t 00 )) B n ( x:t 00 )( 0 ( x:t 00 )) = (( x:t 00 ) 0 ): (4.3) t 0 is the term (t 0 1 t 0 2 ). According to t 0 7 ?! s, we can distinguish the following ve subcases: (4.3.1) t 0 7 ?! s is (t 0 1 t 0 2 ) 7 ?!(t 00 1 t 0 2 ) and is a consequence of t 0 1 7 ?! t 00 1 . Then it is (t 0 1 t 0 2 ) B 1 (t 0 1 )(t 0 2 ) and by the main induction hypothesis we have ((t 0 1 t 0 2 ) ) = ((t 0 1 )(t 0 2 )) B n ((t 00 1 )(t 0 2 )) = ((t 00 1 t 0 2 ) ): 4.4) t 0 is the term (t 00 ). Since t 00 B 1 t 00 ( ) we can apply the main induction hypothesis to t 00 ( ). According to t 0 7 ?! s we can distinguish the following three subcases: t 1 = t; t n = s and for all 1 i < n t i B 1 t i+1 or t i B 1 t i+1 :
In the rst case we have (t i ) = (t i+1 ) and in the latter, by the previous corollary, (t i ) B n (t i+1 ). Together we immediately get (t) B n (s), since B n is transitively closed.
We are ready to prove the con uence of B. Theorem 47 B is Church Rosser.
Proof Let t; t 1 and t 2 be p terms and assume that t B t 1 and t B t 2 : (1) Then the previous corollary immediately implies (t) B n (t 1 ) and (t) B n (t 2 ): (2) By Theorem 42 we know that B n is con uent, hence there is a p term s in substitution normal form satisfying (t 1 ) B n s and (t 2 ) B n s: (3) Since B n B, we get from (3) (t 1 ) B s and (t 2 ) B s; (4) which immediately implies t 1 B (t 1 ) B s and t 2 B (t 2 ) B s:
The claim is established.
Conclusion
We have addressed some defects of the partial calculus p as a constructive framework for partial functions. The drawbacks of p become even more perspicuous in the light of Pezzoli's theorem (cf. Theorem 9). We have proposed a modi cation p of p by explicit substitutions. The system p is embeddable into partial combinatory logic CL p , and therefore, inherits all its models. In particular, p has a standard interpretation in terms of ordinary recursion theory. We have studied a reduction relation for p and we have established a con uence result. The reduction relation gives rise to direct constructions of term models for p . The detailed constructions will be discussed later. As already mentioned, the theory of explicit substitutions has been treated before, primarily in connection with the implementation of functional programming languages. The main reference on weak calculi of explicit substitutions is 5]. In contrast to our approach, not only equality between terms, but also equality between substitutions has been axiomatized in most of the previous work on explicit substitutions (an exception is 20]). Although this can easily be achieved, the systems have much more axioms, and we think that { especially from a foundational point of view { the real concern is to axiomatize and control the notion of a substitution applied to a term, whereas equality between substitutions can be treated in the metalanguage. Furthermore, the previous systems of explicit substitutions are mainly term rewriting systems, and { this is the main di erence to our p calculus { application in those systems is always total. The very purpose of our work, however, was to study questions of substitution in the context of partiality, and to design a more perspicuous version of the partial calculus, which has natural partial models and is equivalent to partial combinatory logic.
The question arises, why one should use a fairly complicated system like p at all, instead of the formally more simple partial combinatory logic CL p . We think that p has advantages over CL p . The main reason is that in the system CL p , the intuitive clarity of the notation is completely lost. Additionally, many mistakes in the literature concerning substitution in CL p suggest that it is also worth having an explicit treatment of substitution as in p . We, therefore, think that p can serve as an adequate applicative basis for systems of explicit mathematics. As already mentioned in the introduction, St ark 27] has recently given a very natural relationship between the programming language SCHEME and the p calculus. In his approach, partiality of p is essential. The results of St ark give further evidence for the foundational signi cance of the p calculus.
